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IN THE SUPRE1'1E COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DORIS STARZEL and
STATE OF UTAH, by
and through Off ice of
Recovery Services,
State Department of
Social Services,

Case No.

Plaintiffs-Respondents,

18374

..

-v-

JOHNNY JARAMILLO,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
The above-captioned· action was brought against the
appellant by Doris Starzel and State of Utah to determine if the
appellant was the natural father of respondent's child, Chad
Starzel, born August 20, 1977.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On January 26, 1982, respondents moved to have the
appellant's answer to the complaint set aside for failure to
answer interrogatories.

The court struck said answer on the

failure of both the appellant and counsel to appear.

Appellant,

by and through new counsel, filed a motion to set aside default
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

judgment which was subsequently denied by the Honorable Boyd
Bunnell on April 19, 1982.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the lower court's order
denying the motion to set aside judgment and the right to have a
trial upon the merits of the case.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
This suit was initiated in December of 1980.

The

respondents' first set of interrogatories was filed with the court
May 18, 1981.

The appellant failed to answer said interrogatories

within the thirty (30) day time limit imposed by Rule 33(a) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Subsequently, Deputy Carbon

County Attorney Gene Strate wrote to Walter R. Ellett, former
attorney for appellant, and requested the answers to interrogatories.

On September 23, 1981, Mr. Ellett responded by letter and advised
the County Attorney that he would be meeting with the appellant
personally to obtain the answers.

Apparently, Mr. Ellett failed

to do so, which prompted Fred Howard, Deputy Carbon County Attorney,
to file a Motion to Compel Discovery.

The court granted said

motion on November 30, 1981, giving the appellant ten (10) days to
comply.

On January 26, 1982, respondents moved the court to set

aside appellant's answer to the complaint for failure to comply
with said order compelling discovery.
was set for February 23, 1982.

A hearing on this motion

Neither the aooellant
nor his
.

counsel appeared at said hearing.

~

On February 26, 1982, the court
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ordered the appellant's answer stricken.

On March 11, 1982, a

default judgment was entered, wherein the appellant was adjudged
to be the natural father of the child in question.

The court

retained jurisdiction to determine the amount of child support.
On March 14, 1982, the appellant was personally served with an
Order to Show Cause requiring him to appear before the court for
the purpose of determining his ability to pay child support.
The following day, March 15, 1982, the appellant met with his
present counsel, Phil L. Hansen, for the first time.

On

March 23,

1982, said counsel filed a motion to have the default judgment
set aside pursuant to Rule 60(b)(l) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

This motion was heard on April 5, 1982, and the order

denying same was entered on April 19, 1982.

Notice of Appeal was

filed by appellant on May 14, 1982.

ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD BE SET ASIDE
IN FAVOR OF A DECISION ON THE MERITS.
Appellant's motion to set aside the default judgment
was made pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure which reads as follows:
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may in the-furtherance of justice relieve
a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect .... The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2),
(3), or (4), not more than three months after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or
taken ... ''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-3Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

It is well settled that the rules of civil procedure
are to be liberally construed with a view to promote justice.
Rule l, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 68-3-2, Utah Code Annotated
(1953).

In this regard, then Justice Crockett in Utah Sand &

Gravel Products Corp. v. Tolbert, 402 P.2d 703 (1965) stated:
"It is true that our new rules of civil
procedure were intended to eliminate undue
and emphasis on technicalities and to
provide liberality in procedure to the end
that disputes be heard and determined on
the merits .... Liberality in their
interpretation and application should be
indulged where no prejudice or disadvantage
to anyone results ... "
This statutory and judicial policy of liberality has been
especially evident in those decisions in which the interpretation
of Rule 60(b) has arisen in the context of a default judgment.
From the earliest decisions of this court, it has been emphasized
that default judgments are viewed with suspicion and that the
authority of the trial court to set aside judgments obtained by
default is to be liberally applied so that there might be a
decision on the merits.
53 P. 1033 (1890).

Utah Commercial & Savings Bank v. Trtllllbo,

This suspicion and disfavor arises from the

recognition that it is a harsh and oppressive action to place a
judgment rigidly and irrevocably on a party without a hearing and
that it is fundamental to our system of justice that each party
to a controversy be given an opportunity to present his side of

the controversy.
(1962).

Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 376 P.2d 951

Illustrative is the following language from Heathman v.
-4-
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Fabian and Clendenin, 377 P.2d 189 (1962):
"Judgments by default are not favored
by the courts nor are they in the interest
of justice and fair play. No one has an
inalienable or constitutional right to a
judgment by default without a hearing on
the merits. The courts, in the interest
of justice and fair play, favor, where
possible, a full and complete opportunity
for a hearing on the merits of every case ... "
Rule 60(b) and its statutory predecessors 1 are of long
standing and have been construed by this court on numerous
occasions.

These decisions have uniformly embraced several

general propositions, the first of which is that the trial court's
determination involving a motion to set aside a default judgment
is largely a discretionary matter, and as a concomitant, that
this court will reverse such a determination only in the event of
an abuse of that discretion.

For example, see Board of Education

of Granite School District v. Cox, 384 P.2d 806 (1963).

Although

it is true that no general rule can be promulgated respecting
the exercise of discretion in setting aside or refusing to set aside
a default judgment since each case must necessarily turn on its
own peculiar facts and circtllllstances, Trtllllbo, supra; Heath v.
Mower, 597 P.2d 855 (1979).

This court has, however, been careful

to define the scope of that discretion, and has by no means given

the trial courts a free hand to refuse to set aside default
judgments.

Thus, in Chrysler v. Chrysler, 303 P.2d 995 (1956)

1Comp. Laws, 1876, § 1293; Rev. Stat. 1898, § 3005;

Com~.

Laws,
1917, §6619; 104-14-4 Rev. Stat., 1933; 104-14-4 Utah Code
Annotated, 1943.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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then Justice Crockett, writing for a unanimous court, stated:
"We are entirelv in accord with the
authorities cited by plaintiff to the
effect that it is generally regarded
as an abuse of discretion for a trial
court to refuse to vacate a default
judgment where timely application is
made and there is any reasonable grounds
for doing so, to the end that cases may
be decided on their merits."
This two-pronged requirement of timeliness and reasonable justification has been subsequently cited with approval in many
decisions.

Mayhew, supra; Board of Education, supra; Westinghouse

Electric Supply Co. v. Larsen, 544 P.2d 876 (1975); and Olsen v.
Cunnnings, 565 P.2d 1123 (1977).
That the motion was timely is clear.

Rule 60(b) imnoses

a three (3) month time limitation on a motion to set aside due to
neglect.

The day after petitioner was served personally with the

Order to Show Cause he met with present counsel who filed a motion
to set aside in five (5) days, clearly within the statutory time
·'

limit.
Appellant also presents a reasonable justification for
setting aside the default judgment.

The fact that appellant has

properly and timely prosecuted this appeal demonstrates a deep,
personal resolve of his innocence and a desire to have the facts
presented and decided on their merits.

Ap~ellant

should not be

judged by his former counsel's apparent neglect in getting answers
to the interrogatories, especially in light of the fact that

present counsel has secured the requested answers to the interrogSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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atories and is prepared to prosecute the case with due diligence.
Present counsel feels it is inappropriate to emphasize the acts
of prior counsel as an excuse for any delays, and would rather
emphasize the pursuit with which present counsel has handled the
case on appeal and suggest that these actions should be examined
in deciding whether the case ought to be heard on the merits.
Again, appellant stresses the words of Justice Crockett
in Chrvsler, supra, that "where timely application is made and
there is any reasonable grounds for doing so," cases should be
decided on the merits.

POINT II
THE ADVANTAGE OF RES JUDICATA IS
OUTWEIGHED BY THE BENEFITS OF A
HEARING ON THE ~RITS.
It is apparent that in exercising its discretion to set
aside a default judgment the trial court is engaged in a balancing
process between two valid considerationso

Warren v. Dixon Ranch

Co., 260 P.2d 711 (1953). In that case this court stated:
"A rule which would permit the
re-opening of cases previously
decided because of error or
ignorance during the progress of
the trial would in large measure
vitiate the effects of res judicata
and create a hardship to the
successful litigant in causing him
to prosecute his action more than once
and possibly lose the ability to
collect his judgment; on the other
hand, the court is anxious to
protect the losing party who has
not had the opportunity to present
his claim or defense."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Thus, the court, in exercising its discretion to refuse to set
aside a default judgment must weigh between the advantage of
enforcing the effect of res judicata and the disadvantage of
not conducting a hearing on the merits.

While a contested action

yields a judgment wherein the value of res judicata is greatest,
a default judgment followed by a delayed appearance, as in the
instant case, carries with it a very low value of finality, that
is:
"There has been no examination of
the merits or, usually, matters of
abatement such as the statute of
limitations, and no substantial
investment of judicial time and
authority. At the same time,
the appearance itself, even though
delayed, indicates that the
defaulting party wishes to contest
the justness of the plaintiff's
claim. Indeed, the only purpose
the default has served is that
of enforcing the rules concerning
time appearance."
Restatement, Second, Judgments, Tentative Draft No. 6, pg. 19.
It appears that the concerns manifested by this court
in Warren, supra, with respect to vacating judgments are outweighed
by the benefits that would be bestowed by a hearing on the merits
in the instant case.

That is, the value of res judicata is low,

since there has been a minimal investment of judicial time and
authority and since respondent would not be substantially
prejudiced by a setting aside of the default and a re-hearing
on the merits.

Respondent will not be prejudiced in her ability
-8-
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to collect the judgment and any costs and attorney's fees
incurred by respondent in taking the default judgment can be made
a condition precedent to the setting aside of the judgment.
Thus, respondent would in no way be prejudiced by a setting aside
of the default judgment.

Furthermore, it is well established

that in all doubtful cases the court should resolve any doubt in
the balancing process towards granting relief from the default
judgment to bring about a trial on the merits.

Cutler v.

Haycock, 90 P. 897 (1907); Hurd v. Ford, 276 P. 908 (1929);
Trumbo, supra.

Additionally, the court in Cutler made the point

that when a difference of opinion exists between the trial court
and the appellate court as to whether a reasonable basis exists
for setting aside the default judgment, then the judgment shall
be set aside.
" ... While as we have already stated,
the mere difference of judgment between
this court and the trial c curt may not
be conclusive, still it raises a serious
doubt, and in such a case a reasonable
doubt is always resolved in favor of
granting a trial upon the merits where
none was had ... "
It should not be forgotten that the allowance of a
vacation of judgment is a creature of equity and the equity takes
into consideration factors which may be irrelevant in actions
at law, such as the unfairness of a party's conduct, his delay
in bringing or continuing the action and the hardship in granting
or denying relief.

Warren v. Dixon Ranch, 260 P.2d 741 (1959).

-9-
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CONCLUSION
The refusal of the lower court to set aside the default
judgment constituted an abuse of discretion.
timely file his motion to set aside

supp~Yrted

Appellant did
by reasonable grounds.

Disputed issues should be disposed of on substantive, rather
than on technical grounds in the interest of justice and fair play.
"It is indeed cormnendable to handle cases
with dispatch and to move calendars with
expedition in order to keep them up to
date. But it is even more important to
keep in mind that the very reason for the
existence of courts is to afford disputants
an opportunity to be heard and to do
justice between them."
Westinghouse Electric Supply v. Larsen, 544 f12d 876 (1975)
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this {)

l~ day

of July, 1982.

HANSEN AND HANSEN
800 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

Attorneys for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two (2) copies of the foregoing
Brief of Appellant were served this
'?:le:;;;\ day of July, 1982,
on the office of David L. Wilkinson, Utah Attorney General, 236
State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114.
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